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Introduction
We conducted a field experiment on the Internet and investigated how participants update their posterior beliefs on the underlying state of the world in an individual learning environment, where they can observe a sequence of private signals, and in a social learning environment, where they can observe a sequence of other people's actions. We analyzed whether participants' belief-updating behaviors are consistent with Bayesian theory and whether they differ depending on the learning environment, comparing with the results of the previous laboratory experiments on informational cascades. In addition, by measuring participant's degree of trust in other people's actions and their conformity to other people's actions, we examine whether they are affected by participant's demographic characteristics.
We observed that participants do not make use of private signals and other people's actions as efficiently as Bayesian theory assumes. We also found that participants report higher posterior beliefs in an individual learning environment than in a social learning environment, even when the theoretical informativeness of the observed sequence of private signals and other people's actions is identical. In addition, we confirmed that participant's trust in other people's actions and their conformity to other people's actions are affected by some of their demographic characteristics.
In the following section, we outline the field experiment and show the framework of individual and social learning. In Section 3, we present the behavioral hypotheses derived from Bayesian theory. In Section 4, we examine whether participants' belief-updating behaviors are consistent with the behavioral hypothesis and whether they differ depending on the learning environment. In Sections 5 and 6, we measure participant's degree of trust in other people's actions and their conformity to other people's actions and investigate whether they are affected by their demographic characteristics. In Section 7, we conclude the discussion.
Individual and social learning in the field experiment
The field experiment was conducted from February 23 to February 24, 2007 , for the registered monitors of 'goo research', a polling agency in Japan. The monitors' ages ranged from 20 to 49 and their various occupations were (1) managers in a private company, (2) employees in an administrative position, (3) teachers, (4) lawyers, CPAs, and tax accountants, or (5) students in junior colleges, universities, or graduate schools 1 .
The field experiment was conducted on the Internet. We sent emails that notified them of the URL at which the experiment would be conducted and 1033 monitors participated in the experiment 2 . When they logged onto the web site, they were randomly categorized into four groups . The role of participant i in group G in this decision-making problem is to submit a prediction about which state will be realized 1 For details of participants' demographic characteristics, see Table 1. 2 They were paid 50 points (equivalent to 50 Japanese yen), which can be pooled and can be exchanged for a cash voucher in payment for participation. We define the process of this decision-making problem as individual learning or social learning depending on the difference in information they observe as follows.
In the individual learning environment, participant i in group G submits In explaining the general structure of the situation in the individual and the social learning environments defined above, we presented the following description to participants. We paraphrased the state of the world as the situation where one of the boxes, either A or B, contains a piece of paper and a private signal as a hint.
"There are two boxes, A and B. One of the two boxes contains a piece of paper on which "You Win" is printed, but the other one contains nothing.
The probability that Box A contains the piece of paper and that Box B contains it are 50% and 50%, respectively. You are not informed which box contains the piece of paper, but you can observe 'hints' or 'other people's predictions'. Your role is to submit a prediction about which box contains the piece of paper and its probability for several rounds based on observed sequences of hints or other people's predictions."
The question t G QA is presented in the beginning of round t as follows.
QA Hint: Box A contains the piece of paper.
Which box contains the piece of paper? Please submit your prediction. Then, estimate the probability that Box A contains the piece of paper and the probability that Box B contains the piece of paper and choose one of the combinations below that is the closest to your estimation. Note that this hint reports the correct answer with probability 2/3 and the incorrect answer with probability 1/3. Note also that the hints you observe may not always report the correct answer, but the box containing the piece of paper does not change from the first round to the final round." 
by choosing one of the 20 combinations of probabilities that "the probability that Box A contains the piece of paper" and "the probability that Box B contains the piece of paper" from 0% to 100% at 5% intervals.
Which box contains the piece of paper? Please submit your prediction. Then, estimate the probability that Box A contains the piece of paper and the probability that Box B contains it and choose one of the combinations below that is the closest to your estimation. Note that the other person t # has submitted his/her prediction after observing other people's predictions and hints in the same way as you do."
After reading
Behavioral hypotheses
In this section, we consider the belief-updating behavior by a rational Bayesian participant in an individual and a social learning environment. , the posterior probability should be:
Given the sequence of hints we presented to participants,
in each group at each round should be those summarized in the eighth column in , her prediction does not convey any information about the state of the world. Thus, the other person in round 4 inevitably ignores the prediction by the other person in round 3 and he submits his prediction in exactly the same way as by the person in round 3. In this way, people after round 4 ignore their predecessors' predictions and behave as if they were in round 3 if the first two people's predictions happen to correspond. Informational cascades, formulated by Bikhchandani et al. (1992) QB , we collected data in a total of 16 different sequences. In this section, we examine whether participants' belief-updating behaviors are consistent with the behavioral hypotheses by a rational Bayesian proposed in the previous section, and whether they differ depending on the learning environment.
The sixth column of 
In the laboratory experiments on informational cascades, such Bayesian inconsistent behaviors are often observed. In fact, Anderson and Holt (1997) , Dominitz and Hung (2004) , and Hung and Plott (2001) found that not all subjects submitted The two cells between the bold lines in the seventh column of Table 2 Anderson and Holt, 1997, and Nöth and Weber, 2003) . These studies typically argue participants' overconfidence on the grounds of their Bayesian inconsistent behavior in discrete choice problems.
However, we argue that our result is more robust than theirs because we elicited all participants' posterior beliefs in both the individual and the social learning environments and found that even the same participant, on average, submits higher posterior beliefs in the individual learning environment than in the social learning environment for all sequences. Because we do not use a dummy variable for students, we argue that managers in a private company, employees in an administrative position, and lawyers, CPAs, and tax accountants are more likely than students to distrust other people's decisions.
Participant's trust in other people's actions and their demographic characteristics

Participant's conformity to other people's actions and their demographic characteristics
In this section, we measure participant's conformity to other people's decisions and examine whether it is influenced by their degree of trust in other people's decisions and their demographic characteristics.
To do this, we consider a situation where participants make decisions on the same problems with and without reference to other people's decision making. If participant i makes an arbitrary decision when he cannot refer to other people's decisions, but makes the same decision as that chosen by some influential people when he can refer to their decisions, we regard such decisions as conformity to other people's decisions. In order to explain this inconsistency, we may have to consider the possibility that the conformity in QC and QD is caused by different mechanisms. In the literature of 14 The proportion of participants choosing "not support" increases from 1 − QD to social psychology, Deutsch and Gerard (1955) distinguished two types of social influence which causes the conformity. They refer to the informational social influence as the influence "to accept information obtained from another as evidence about reality." They also refer to the normative social influence as the influence "to conform with the positive expectations of another." In QC , if participants make use of the result of the Golden Globe Award in predicting which movie would win the Academy Award, we can interpret that their conformity is caused by the informational social influence.
On the other hand in QD , if participants feel that they should comply with other people after recognizing the fact that many other people do not support the Abe cabinet, we can interpret that their conformity is caused by the normative social influence.
Concluding remarks
This study examines belief-updating behavior in individual and social learning 
